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This essay does two things. It offers one possible interpretation of Arne Næss's ultimate ecosophic norms, and 
it shows how these norms can support the following three statements in the deep ecological platform (dep.): 
 
(dep. 1): The flourishing of human and non-human life on Earth has intrinsic value. The 
value of non-human life forms is independent of the usefulness these may have for 
narrow human purposes. 
(dep. 2): Richness and diversity of life forms are values in themselves and contribute to 
the flourishing of human and non-human life on Earth. 
(dep. 3): Humans have no right to reduce this richness and diversity except to satisfy vital 
needs.2
 
I shall trace deep ecological argumentation from Næss's ultimate premises to these platform principles. I will 
move stepwise down his normative hierarchy, which is conceived on analogy to a hypothetical-deductive 
system.3 This is not a strict formal logical system, but a "practical" derivative argumentation. 
 
Ecosophy T:4 The Bergson-Spinoza Connection 
 
Inspiration for Ecosophy T has been drawn from a number of sources, most importantly Benedict de Spinoza 
and Mahatma Gandhi.5
 However, few readers of the literature of deep ecology have seen clearly how Næss uses Henri Bergson in his 
reading of Spinoza. In this presentation, I shall take Bergson's summary of Spinoza as a point of departure to 
Næss's philosophy. This scheme is in line with Næss's insistence that Ecosophy T could be read in the light of 
Bergson: "[...] together with Spinoza he [Bergson] is one of the most important harbingers of the deep ecology 
movement I am working on."  Bergson views Spinoza's basic intuition as follows: 6
 
[...] it is the feeling of a coincidence between the act by which our mind knows truth 
perfectly, and the operation by which God engenders it. [...] when man, sprung from 
divinity, succeeds in returning to it, he perceives that what he had at first taken to be 
two opposed movements of coming and going are in fact a single movement.7
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
By the phrase "a single movement," Bergson is alluding to Spinoza's holism. At once a whole and a multitude 
of parts, created nature (natura naturata), may be understood as the effect of an internal causal unity in this 
whole; that is, as creative nature (natura naturans).8 Thus, "Whatsoever is, is in God, and without God nothing 
can be, or be conceived."9 This is to say that every human being, like every other being, ontologically speaking, 
"is in God" or Nature (with a capital N), and "... emanates from the Deity." In Ecosophy T, therefore, the 
human purpose is to reach an adequate understanding of his or her being-in-Nature, an understanding that may 
be seen, as Bergson writes, as an epistemological re-entry into creative nature. This is achieved through the 
understanding of concrete particular beings as expressions of the Deity. Spinoza assumes that Nature is the 
immanent cause of itself and of all other things, and that, as a result without limits. Nature (with capital N) must 
be completely present in all its effects (or it would be divisible) and as much present in the parts as in the 
whole. It follows that particular things differ only in the modal sense. Thus Spinoza can write: "The more we 
understand particular things, the more we understand God."10 Humans are able to understand themselves as 
striving sub specie aeternitatis.11 From this point of view, what human beings first and foremost achieve is an 
understanding of their own striving to persist in being, not within abstract and quantified time, but as a kind of 
(Bergsonian) duration within eternity.12 Linking Spinoza to Bergson's distinction between duration (la durée) 
and abstract time (temps), Naess, in Ecosophy T, develops this concept further: 
 
Ecosophy T concentrates especially upon the aspect of general unfolding in suo esse. 
For life in general it implies the "creative evolution" (Bergson), the steady extension 
of the biosphere, from the comfortable, lukewarm, shallow seas to arctic oceans and 
steaming hotwater springs.13
 
Næss appears to interpret this creative evolution of particular beings—indeed of all nature through the striving 
to persist in its being—as an expression of the ultimate norm of Ecosophy. 
 
 
(N1): "Self-realization!"14 
 
According to Spinoza, the power each particular being has to struggle for self-preservation is an expression of 
the power of God in his active aspect,15 so that those who realize themselves can be said to be living the life of 
God. Næss links this with Gandhi's concept of self-realization and the distinction between a "little self" (with a 
lower-case ’s’) and "the big Self" (with a capital ’S’).16 The Self (or Nature) is absolutely infinite and, by 
necessity, finds expression in all finite beings. Every act of (self-)expression is constitutive of the particular 
being's striving for better self-perseverance. Spinoza assumes this to be a necessity, hence Bergson's notion of 
an action whereby God brings about a non-arbitrary realization. It is the human condition to participate fully in 
the realization of the Self. Hence, the norm to "Seek complete self-realization!," that is, to seek an 
understanding of the being from which one proceeds, Nature. The Norm (N1) applies to all finite rational 
beings, and not to Nature in itself. Nor does one need such norms, if one has achieved adequate understanding; 
the norms are simply intended as crutches for the liberation strategies for constrained humans.17 The ultimate 
aim of these strategies is a complete self-realization.18
 
The two related concepts of "Self" and "self," representing Nature and the individual respectively, are 
fundamental to the understanding of the dual usage of the term "self-realization." Næss presumes, on the one 
hand, an all-inclusive Self, or Nature; on the other hand, the concept a person of inadequate self-insight would 
form of himself as an isolated or social ego.19
 
There are a number of varieties of this ego-concept. Some are extremely inadequate and concentrate one-
dimensionally on what it means to be human. Others set up a model of free humans as a goal of self-realization 
 
 
 
 
 
 
to be earnestly pursued.20 In addition to this passive striving for liberation, there is the active striving of the 
free.21 The difference between pleasure and joy is tied to these two types of freedom.22 Adequate self-
understanding is that through which one realizes oneself as a part of the whole, all-encompassing Self, which 
does not exist separated from particular beings. Though inspired by Gandhi and not Spinoza, this Self-
understanding is paralleled in Spinoza's writings on thinking as part of the infinite intellect.23
 
At least two important questions can be raised in connection with the injunction to seek complete self-
realization. First, what does it mean to seek or strive? Second, what is the identity of the inadequate and the 
actualized Self-realizing humans, respectively? 
 
Human struggle for Self-realization may be adequate or inadequate, a situation characterized by constrained 
passivity or free activity respectively. The aim is to find a strategy of liberation from a constrained and passive 
to a free and active level of being. This is the basic idea in Bergson's reading of Spinoza's intuition as two 
opposing movements (the free and the constrained) that unites in one. 
  
Inadequate self-realization is to be understood as constrained realization to the extent that one does not 
recognize being part of a free non-arbitrary Nature. Only a person of inadequate self-understanding will assume 
that he or she is in possession of a free will unconstrained by Nature. An atomistic view of human beings as 
separated from the gestalt of wills in the life-world does, from an ecosophic point of view, entail an inadequate 
and constrained view of the human condition. People with such inadequate self understanding would need 
ecosophic norms as a moral guide in practical life. 
 
An adequate understanding of one's own struggle involves that one understand oneself as an expression of the 
infinite powers of Nature's creation. Through a completely adequate recognition and realization of (N1), 
humans come to understand that their struggle follows by necessity from the struggle of Nature, and that it has 
an inner link with other parts of the environment through a common inner cause, Nature. This is an amoral 
element in Spinoza that goes beyond his concern with "good" and "bad" values.24
 
In the final analysis, Ecosophy T too is amoral in the sense that one recognizes one's non-accidental necessity 
as being above any norm. As being-in-Nature, or in the Self, through an adequate understanding, one is raised 
even above one's own normative system. This does not mean that one understands one's own struggle as part of 
Nature as a whole. The relation between Nature and the particular parts is not a relation between part and 
whole, but one between unity and plurality. Those who can see their own striving in this way, will see 
themselves as parts of creative nature and in the light of the inner unity that brings about creative nature as a 
non-separately existing whole and as a plurality of parts.25
 
Between the "adequate" and "inadequate" poles, people strive to put aside private (constrained) self-realization 
and recognize their being-in-the-Self.26 What consequences does this have for the identity of the individual? 
Ecosophic self-realization is a recognition of biospheric interdependence in the Self. Everything is connected in 
an eco-social unity. The individual is part of coexistence with Nature, a coexistence that is for the best of all 
concerned.27 Individuals realize themselves through identification with the extended Self or Nature. Self-
realization is achieved through identification and symbolic coexistence with Nature. The sense of taking part in 
a greater context is basic to the individual's self-respect and self-esteem. If this greater context is destroyed, "[..] 
nothing appears to remain [of the self]."28 This does not, however, imply that self-realization is bound up with 
particular groups. Inadequate self-recognition as an isolated ego independent of the deeper eco-social unity is a 
misconceived and "shallow" self-recognition, as opposed to a "deep," adequate understanding of the self within 
the biosphere.29 An increase in recognition of biospheric togetherness is according to the ecosophy pleasurable, 
while a private ego-realization is tragic and full of sorrows.30 Which is not to say that private ego-realization is 
perceived as misery; the individual in question may well experience happiness, but this happiness is passive and 
not active. These passive joys are like "the pleasures of slaves under the tyranny of passions."31 
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